It is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. law, treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain… -Presidential Directive Maritime Security Policy December 21, 2004 The oceans and seas compose more than two-thirds of the earth's surface and are the medium by which eighty percent of the world's trade is moved. 1 The United
States is a maritime nation within this massive ocean realm, with more than 12,000 miles of contiguous coastline and 9 major commercial ports. 2 The United States' maritime character is central to its national security and economic prosperity, and its substantial ocean-borne access and port infrastructure provide vast potential for commercial primacy, financial wealth and sea power. However, these attributes also make the United States extremely vulnerable to potential threats by a number of different actors using a number of different methods to destroy or disable shipping and infrastructure, traffic conventional weapons or WMDs, or traffic people and contraband. This same seamlessness and transparency allows MDA to facilitate maritime security.
The strategic implication of MDA is to use this awareness to protect the United States and its ports from maritime threats to minimize its vulnerabilities and to expand that security across the globe through cooperation with friends and allies. In theory,
MDA is accomplished by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and other U.S. Government agencies to protect the United States' economic interests and ensure its security; and in concert with multi-national partners to maximize domain awareness across the world.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), published in September 2005, addresses the overarching United States strategy for protecting the nation's vast maritime domain and maritime interests. The strategy is presented in three main parts:
1) Threats to Maritime Security; 2) Strategic Objectives; and 3) Strategic Actions.
Threats include potentially destructive, disruptive or criminal acts perpetrated by nation-states, terrorists, and transnational actors and pirates, as well as environmental destruction and illegal immigration.
Strategic objectives of the NSMS include preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts; protecting maritime population centers and critical infrastructure; minimizing damage and expediting recovery; and safeguarding the ocean and its resources.
Strategic actions listed in the NSMS include enhancing international cooperation, maximizing domain awareness, embedding security into commercial practices, deploying layered security, and ensuring the continuity of the marine transportation system.
Purpose
The purpose of this Strategy Research Project is to provide a Maritime Domain Awareness Model with strategic purpose and application that maximizes the capabilities of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, international maritime forces, and federal, state, local and international government agencies within a construct of collaborative and cooperative intelligence and information sharing to effect the NSMS. The Strategic MDA Model will link various ways and means to fulfill NSMS ends so that commanders and agencies at all levels can decide and act to achieve effects that support the NSMS.
This project will present Strategic MDA by addressing existing multi-agency capabilities and information systems, as well as provide recommendations for new and enhanced capabilities to support the NSMS.
Strategic Implications for Maritime Domain Awareness
As previously discussed, MDA is the merging of threat and situational awareness to maximize overall awareness of the maritime realm. For the U.S. Navy, the interagency, and ally and coalition-partner navies, MDA is intended to maximize the visibility of the entire massive global maritime realm for application across the Range of
Military Operations (ROMO) to provide national and global maritime security. The Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept states that MDA has application at the Tactical,
Operational and Strategic levels of command. 6 However, an assessment of the MDA Concept from the strategic perspective is necessary to apply it to the NSMS.
MDA is more complex than a simple fusion of maritime tactics, individual threats and defined timelines. Rather, it is a global, multi-agency, all threat construct. Table
One provides a useful contrast between the focus of MDA and traditional maritime security foci, and it lays a groundwork for presenting the strategic application of MDA to meet the strategic ends of the NSMS. Laying the Strategic MDA Groundwork --The Components: National and Global MDA Although national strategy can be defined and interpreted in a number of ways, one of its purposes is to define a nation's long-term economic, political and security goals for achieving its maximum prosperity, vitality and viability. Strategy compels the purpose, doctrine and resources to achieve these goals. Because security strategy goals are focused on protecting the nation from threats both at home and across the globe the strategic application of MDA must have both a national and global component to meet the goals of the NSMS. Expanded cooperation with the maritime forces of other nations requires more interoperability with multinational partners possessing varying levels of technology. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative will serve as a catalyst for increased international interoperability in support of cooperative maritime security. 10 Additionally, global naval partners could share information and operate, as required, with other nations' central and military intelligence agencies, maritime customs, law enforcement, etc., in order to further optimize MDA. Operating and coordinating within this shared construct will allow the U.S. Navy specifically, to employ forward-deployed naval forces to identify and disrupt, or destroy potential threats to the United States miles from the homeland.
Cooperative planning and coordination, information-sharing, common command and control systems and combined operations by the U.S. Navy and U.S. agencies in both the subordinate national domain, and with multinational partners in the global domain provide the inexorable link between both domains that is required to achieve Strategic MDA.
The Strategic MDA Model
The U.S. could implement strategic MDA to effect both National and Global MDA goals within an overarching strategic construct. The following model shown in Figure 1 provides a useful construct by which the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the interagency and global partners could fulfill the aims of the NSMS. components and agencies; and the systems and media that provide intelligence and information analysis and dissemination. In total, the model prescribes the ways, means and ends to strategically apply MDA to fulfill the National Strategy for Maritime Security that culminates with a construct for operational decision makers to decide and act in order to achieve the desired effects to fulfill the NSMS. However, these same attributes of the commercial maritime realm and the opportunities they present could easily be exploited by a variety of actors who could do serious harm to economic and security interests by attacking shipping, ports, and maritime population centers.
Additionally, these actors could exploit maritime commerce to destroy vessels at sea or in port, attack the United States and its allies with conventional weapons or WMDs, and traffic those weapons, as well as terrorists and illegal aliens. The NSMS addresses five threats to maritime security: nation-state threats, terrorist threats, and transnational criminal and piracy threats, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. The strategic application of MDA will mitigate these threats to execute maritime security strategy actions and fulfill maritime security strategy goals. MHQs with MOCs will be resident at U.S. fleet commands worldwide and will provide shared information and knowledge across fleets for MDA, homeland security and homeland defense; and will be globally netted with combatant commander staffs and deployed naval forces. 12 Multi-national partner navies augment and amplify the capabilities of the U.S.
Navy and one of the benefits of the Global Maritime Partnership is that it provides a preponderance of capabilities that are less prevalent in the U.S. Navy, including riverine and coastal patrol forces that offer speed and access to dissuade or engage threats inland and close ashore where larger naval forces and platforms might be unable to operate.
The United States Coast Guard has undergone significant organizational changes and has enjoyed a growth in offensive, defensive and law enforcement capability since September 11 th , 2001. It has grown from being primarily a regulatory agency concerned with counter-narcotics, search and rescue, fishery and resources enforcement, and similar competencies to today's U.S. Coast Guard, which has undertaken additional roles of maritime security, and geographically-sectored security enforcement and inspection throughout the United States. The multi-mission U.S.
Coast Guard's can execute a variety of functions such as law enforcement, national defense, maritime security, environmental protection and humanitarian response. 13 Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard has enjoyed a long history of joint purpose with the global maritime community and cooperation with U.S. and international agencies that allow it to be a key supporter to Strategic MDA. As a member of the U.S.
Armed Forces, a law-enforcement and regulatory agency, a member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community and a collaborative response partner with federal, state and local authorities with strong civil-military partnerships and broad jurisdiction to counter threats and mitigate hazards 14 , the U.S. Coast Guard has become a critical asset in effecting Strategic MDA and supporting the NSMS.
Just as the United States' international naval partners augment the U.S. Navy's ability to project power to deter, disrupt and destroy maritime threats, the coast guards of our friends and allies bring capabilities like the U.S. Coast Guard's to the fore. By While each of these agencies has unique purposes and specialized capabilities, through cooperation they can support National, Global and ultimately Strategic MDA by using these capabilities to implement the NSMS. The NMCOP is a near-real-time, dynamically tailorable, network-centric information grid shared by all U.S. Federal, state, and local agencies that have maritime interests and responsibilities, and it facilitates awareness and decision making through distributed and shared object and track databases. 15 Existing information-sharing technologies that support the NMCOP include the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Vessel Tracking System (VTS), which is U.S. Coast Guardoperated and provides radar and camera surveillance and tracking and advisory navigation in places like New York Harbor, the approaches to various ports in the Puget Sound region and elsewhere. While GCCS and VTS are two good examples of NMCOP enablers, new initiatives must be undertaken to enhance the nation's maritime COP that joins the efforts of all the aforementioned agencies and forces to locate, track, monitor, and if required, deter, disrupt, destroy or apprehend the threats discussed in the NSMS. As presented in the Strategic MDA Model, these threats are given more fidelity as the detectables, including, but not limited to: vessels, cargoes, people and infrastructure.
RMSA networks facilitate the planning and intelligence information sharing at the global level in much the same way that the NMCOP achieves it at the national level, but through cooperation with allied and multi-national maritime forces afforded by the Global Maritime Partnership and collaboration between U.S. and international agencies.
RMSA networks will provide an accurate presentation of the international maritime domain to meet NSMS goals by contributing to border security, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-piracy, especially in places with no governance or gaps in jurisdiction like archipelagos, straits and chokepoints, and congested coastal approaches. 16 The first step in the RMSA endeavor is to establish a multi-entity participant and common information systems construct much like that outlined for NMCOP for application and operation in various regions around the world. Much of this undertaking is already achieved by virtue of a culture of cooperation between NATO and multinational navies and coast guards, national vessel tracking systems, the sharing of military and national intelligence, and information sharing within INTERPOL.
To this end, ample technology and infrastructure to support the RMSA endeavor already exists in many parts of the Americas, Europe, Asia and Australia, but Africa is an area of concern for regional maritime awareness, especially with the advent of U.S. 21 Another useful surveillance tool is the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC), which would enable African navies to monitor coastal waters and respond to illegalities and anomalies. RMAC is an array of coastal radar that can detect and track vessels as far as twenty-five nautical miles from the coast in all weather conditions. 22 Both AIS and RMAC will enhance Africa's regional MDA and RMSA networks.
African Command (AFRICOM
In addition, there are impediments that must be overcome to bolster the RMSA concept for Global MDA assurance and to prevent seams and gaps between Global and National MDA that could minimize or preclude the application of Strategic MDA. To this end, RMSAs must be linked into the NMCOP, which will be primarily achieved by the aforementioned Navy MHQ with MOC. MHQs / MOCs will take threat and situational awareness data and information gleaned from the RMSA networks of multi-national navies and governments, and disseminate it throughout the NMCOP for use by maritime security interagency stakeholders.
Together, NMCOP and RMSA networks link National and Global MDA, respectively to enable the employment of the Strategic MDA Model by joining the means and ways: maritime forces, the interagency, and analysis and dissemination capabilities against threats and detectable entities, as defined in the model to fulfill the strategic objectives and execute the strategic actions of the NSMS.
Using Strategic MDA to Implement the Objectives and Apply the Actions of the NSMS As outlined in the Strategic MDA Model, the aforementioned agencies, through cooperation and collaboration within common networks and information systems will support the NSMS by preventing attacks, protecting maritime population centers and infrastructure, minimizing damage, expediting recovery, and safeguarding the ocean.
Likewise, they will enhance international cooperation, embed security into commercial practices, deploy layered security, and ensure the continuity of the marine transportation system. Operations (LIO), augmented by Coast Guard Title 14 law enforcement power will facilitate the apprehension of terrorists, pirates and other transnational criminals to achieve NSMS objectives and take NSMS actions.
Second, although VTS is designed primarily to ensure the continuity and safety of vessel navigation to optimize shipping volume management and scheduling, it is also able to detect threats and anomalies. Initiatives to enhance VTS capability at home and abroad will further facilitate the achievement of NSMS objectives. One such initiative is the establishment of Interagency Operational Centers that merge intelligence and operational efforts of federal, state and local participants. These centers will provide intelligence and operational data from sensors, radars, and cameras to the interagency around the clock. 23 The purpose of these centers is to improve awareness of vessels, port facilities, and port operations, and they will have command and control functionality to convey near-real-time information to maritime forces and other agencies that provide national maritime security. 24 Third, there are several other initiatives that could be undertaken that both enhance existing capabilities and provide new capabilities for maritime forces and the interagency to obtain and share information for the employment of Strategic MDA and the implementation of the NSMS. Some of these include: nuclear detection systems to find and report attempts to import a nuclear device or radiological material; enhanced coastal surveillance through airborne, buoyed, shore-based and offshore platformbased radar and day/night camera systems; enhanced open-ocean surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to better identify unknown vessels, and provide additional information on crew activity and cargo; interoperable information systems that transfer data between sensors, platforms, and people to exploit and defeat threats' vulnerabilities; data transfers and access to agency-unique databases and intelligence files for analysis and dissemination; automated and collaborative analysis tools for collecting, fusing, and correlating data to create correlated tracks and determine anomalies; and information pertaining to vessels, cargo and people to ascertain further screening requirements and other protective measures, and distinguish between normal and anomalous behaviors.
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Other important international maritime security achievements that deserve wider application are the US Customs Service Container Security Initiative, which provides end-to-end in-transit visibility of container cargoes and includes operations at 58 total ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America. 26 Additionally, much can be done at the state and local government, and lawenforcement levels both in the U.S. and internationally. Port authorities and police provide an extra layer of awareness in and beyond the maritime realm, especially with their ability to monitor access from ports and harbors into wider inland population centers, as well as apprehend transnational criminals and search for and seize contraband.
Cooperative initiatives in the police community intended to counter terrorism and international crime could help to achieve strategic MDA to counter maritime threats.
One such initiative has been undertaken by the New York City Police Department, which has embedded one or more of its police officers in countries across the world in the Americas, Europe and Asia for counterterrorism and cooperative training and information sharing. 27 While this program is intended mainly to provide early warning for terrorist threats against New York City, it and initiatives like it will enhance the ability of state and local governments and their law enforcement agencies to further support Strategic MDA and support the NSMS.
Feasibility: Overcoming Impediments to Intelligence Sharing & Interagency Coordination
Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing is critical for applying the Strategic MDA Model to the NSMS.
It is also a potential impediment to implementation because of a long-standing U.S.
culture of security classification for maximum secrecy and interagency competition, both of which have led to a poor track record of intelligence sharing within the U.S. Information sharing with multi-national partners has its own unique challenges and impediments, stemming mainly from a Cold War Era culture that emphasizes maximum secrecy and access restrictions. To truly optimize RMSA networks, a new culture of information sharing must be adopted that emphasizes the "need to share" over the "need to know." As discussed in the Maritime Domain Awareness Concept, overcoming barriers that inhibit navy networks and command and control systems from sharing data with international partners will require the following: reevaluating security classification and access restrictions; pushing maritime security related information to the lowest possible level while maintaining security and protecting sources; and implementing information dissemination controls through the development of multi-level security access devices and protocols. 31 Obviously, some intelligence will be either too sensitive, advantageous, or potentially damaging to national security that it cannot be shared with our multi-national partners. However, a reasonable construct for information sharing, with conditions like NORTHCOM is best suited to undertake this role because its responsibilities for homeland defense give it the unique ability to coordinate amongst the DoD (specifically, to control maritime forces and receive support from maritime forces controlled by other combatant commanders), the interagency, state and local authorities, and the private sector for homeland defense and civil support 34 .
This undertaking is feasible because the establishment of a JIACG within a combatant command is achievable, viable and not unprecedented. U.S. Central It is important to note that although this is an example of a JIATF, CENTCOM had an established JIACG in place from which it could create the JIATF-CT.
NORTHCOM likewise needs a JIACG, but specifically needs a JIACG-M that would be manned like the JIATF-CT but in relatively larger proportion. The JIACG-M would be able to develop the plans, procedures, policies and agreements needed to significantly improve strategic awareness in the maritime domain by using all instruments of national power, as well as with state and local governments, the maritime industry and international partners 36 to support NSMS strategic ends.
The JIACG-M is a key national security issue worth supporting because it is critical to enabling Strategic MDA and fulfilling the NSMS. With respect to advocacy before the Congress and the Executive Branch, the Department of Homeland Security should champion the NORTHCOM JIACG-M construct, while funding should come from a DoD appropriation for JIACG military personnel and programs, and a DHS appropriation for the interagency components.
Conclusion
The vastness of the maritime domain, the highly-industrialized nature of the world's commercial seaports and the massive volume of daily international shipping presents a plethora of opportunities for terrorists, criminals, pirates and other transnational actors to threaten, disrupt or attack the U.S. at home and around the world through both conventional and unconventional means.
Countering threats, enhancing national maritime security and protecting U.S. maritime interests are together, a complex undertaking that requires close coordination between the maritime forces of the United States and her friends and allies, as well as all levels of national and international government.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security is the overarching guidance and strategic concept for achieving these important objectives, but it cannot be realized without the Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness Model. The Strategic MDA Model provides enhanced functionality, coordination and fidelity through a robust multi-agency
